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ABSTRACT  
Objectives: ‘Nanny-state’ accusations can function as powerful rhetorical weapons against 
interventions intended to promote public health. Public health advocates often lack effective 
rebuttals to these criticisms. Nanny-state accusations are largely accusations of paternalism. They 
conjure up emotive concern about undue governmental interference undermining peoples’ 
autonomy. But autonomy can be understood in various ways. We outline three main conceptions of 
autonomy, argue that these that can underpin three different conceptions of paternalism, and 
consider implications for responses to nanny-state accusations and the assessment of public health 
interventions.  
Study design and methods: Detailed conceptual analysis.  
Results: The conceptions of paternalism implicit in nanny-state accusations generally depend on 
libertarian conceptions of autonomy. These reflect unrealistic views of personal independence and 
do not discriminate sufficiently between trivial and important freedoms. Decisional conceptions of 
paternalism, like their underlying decisional conceptions of autonomy, have limited applicability in 
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public health contexts. Relational conceptions of paternalism incorporate relational conceptions of 
autonomy, so recognise that personal autonomy depends on socially shaped skills, self-identities and 
self-evaluations as well as externally structured opportunities. They encourage attention to the 
various ways that social interactions and relationships, including disrespect, stigmatisation and 
oppression, can undermine potential for autonomy. While nanny-state accusations target any 
interference with negative freedom, however trivial, relational conceptions direct concerns to those 
infringements of negative freedom, or absences of positive freedom, serious enough to undermine 
self-determination, self-governance and/or self-authorisation.  
Conclusion: Relational conceptions of autonomy and paternalism offer public health policymakers 
and practitioners a means for rebutting nanny-state accusations, and can support more nuanced and 
more appropriately demanding appraisals of public health interventions. (249 words)  
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Highlights  
 Public health interventions are sometimes criticised as ‘nanny-state’ actions 
 A ‘nanny-state’ action is a type of (allegedly) paternalistic action 
 An allegedly paternalistic act is considered wrong because it undermines autonomy 
 ‘Nanny-state’ accusations rely on a flawed libertarian conception of autonomy   
 A relational conception of autonomy and paternalism is more useful to public health 
 
 
‘Nanny-state’ is a negative, even derisive, descriptor. It is levelled against states, agencies or 
interventions that, with the intention of achieving some kind of good, are alleged to interfere 
excessively—by some standard—in the lives of citizens.1 Mayor Bloomberg’s 2012 attempt to limit 
the portion size of soda served in New York has become a paradigm example of ‘the nanny-state’. 
This is in part because the Center for Consumer Freedom, a  third-party organisation funded by food, 
beverage and tobacco industries, sought to counter the proposed changes by running a high-
exposure mass media campaign featuring a photo-shopped image of Bloomberg dressed as a 
nanny.1, 2  
As the Bloomberg example illustrates, nanny-state language is a feature of political and public 
discourse. Although the precise meaning of ‘nanny-state’ is often unclear, academic analyses suggest 
that the term is most often used against identifiable, novel interferences in individual choices, made 
ostensibly for the good of the recipients.1, 3, 4 Nanny-state criticisms tend to be immoderate, 
politically or ideologically motivated and poorly argued, sometimes with an ad hominem quality.5 
‘The nanny-state’ can operate as a frame,6 implying—without detailed argumentation—that the 
problem at hand is interference, or even tyranny, and that the solution is total individual freedom 
and/or total personal responsibility.3-5  
These analyses of nanny-state rhetoric suggest that the meaning of ‘nanny-state’ is close that of 
another concept: paternalism, a contentious issue in public health ethics.7 Some authors have 
argued that concern about the nanny-state, or paternalism more generally, is a distraction from 
more important moral considerations in public health, and/or that the project of defining 
paternalism should be abandoned altogether.3, 5, 8, 9 We agree that paternalism should not dominate 
public health ethics. However because nanny-state accusations can function as a powerful rhetorical 
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weapon against public health,3 and because advocates of public health interventions often seem to 
lack effective rebuttals to these accusations, we believe the conceptualisation of paternalism does 
need  attention. In what follows we will analyse the concept of paternalism in detail to help assess 
nanny-state accusations.  
We start by outlining a standard account of paternalism, noting that paternalism is a nested concept 
that relies on two other concepts: welfare and autonomy. The wrong of paternalism lies in its 
implications for autonomy, so we focus particularly on this. We use Catriona Mackenzie’s recent 
work on competing conceptions of autonomy10, 11 to derive competing conceptions of paternalism, 
including nanny-state paternalism. We argue that the nanny-state conception of paternalism relies 
on problematic assumptions about people, social life and autonomy, and that a relational 
conception of paternalism is more descriptively accurate and more normatively useful. The 
relational conception offers resources to rebut nanny-state accusations when these are levelled 
against morally justifiable public health interventions. It also allows a more nuanced evaluation of 
the potential for unjustified paternalism within public health interventions. 
We will use ‘the paternalist’ to indicate the individual or group actor whose actions may be 
paternalistic, and ‘the subject’ to indicate the recipient/s of this action.12 
PATERNALISM: THE BASIC CONCEPT 
The literature on paternalism is dominated by efforts to differentiate descriptively between 
paternalistic and non-paternalistic acts.13-15 Two conditions feature in most standard accounts of 
paternalism:15 
1. The paternalist in some way undermines, constricts or limits the autonomy, freedom or liberty 
of the subject; and  
2. The paternalist justifies this action on the grounds that it promotes what she understands to be 
the good, welfare or benefit of the subject. 
On most accounts, both the first (autonomy-undermining) and second (welfare-justification) 
conditions must be satisfied for an action to be considered paternalistic.   
Paternalism is a somewhat paradoxical concept. The term generally has a negative valence. However 
an action can be paternalistic only if it is expected to produce a good or benefit (or prevent a 
decrease in an existing good or benefit). Actions that limit autonomy, freedom or liberty but do not 
have welfare as their goal are merely autonomy-undermining, coercive or restrictive. An accusation 
of paternalism, in contrast, implies that the paternalist is seeking to justify a wrong (in relation to 
autonomy) with reference to the welfare that may ensue. Thus, the particular usefulness of the 
negatively-valenced concept of paternalism hinges on its somewhat paradoxical enclosure of the 
positively-valenced concept of welfare or benefit. 
There is contention over whether the concept of paternalism also includes a non-consent condition. 
Some accounts suggest that, to be considered paternalistic, an action must be done against the will 
of, or without the consent of, the subject.7, 15 There are various ways of understanding consent, and 
the relation between consent and autonomy is complex.16 We will assume that a non-consent 
condition is unnecessary given that an autonomy-undermining condition is central to the concept of 
paternalism. There are several reasons for this. First, processes designed to attain consent are 
usually intended to ensure respect for autonomy, although their implications for autonomy in the 
more meaningful senses of that term are often very limited.16, 17 Respecting and/or promoting some 
of the conceptions of autonomy considered below is more demanding than simply attaining consent, 
but will also be likely to include something like working with rather than against or absent a person’s 
will or consent, at least on things that matter to most citizens. Second, in a public health context, a 
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requirement for active personal consent would essentially forbid most intervention, as it would be 
impractical to achieve this from individual citizens. A conception of paternalism that required active 
personal consent would put a much greater demand on public health actions than on most actions 
carried out by governments. Third, its impracticality means a consent condition would not offer any 
additional ability to discriminate between justifiable and unjustifiable public health actions. We 
believe that closer attention to the conception of autonomy that matters for paternalism will 
provide more useful discrimination between justified and unjustified public health interventions.  
In the context of interventions at a population rather than an individual level, it is not always clear 
who “the subject” is. In particular, the subjects of the autonomy-undermining condition and the 
subjects of the welfare-justification condition may not always be the same population or sub-group 
of the population. In the case of the soda ban, for example, there are two relevant classes of subject: 
people who buy large sodas and so may lose this freedom, and people who are overweight and thus 
ostensibly may benefit from consuming fewer calories. These two groups will overlap, but not 
completely. Thus “the subject” of the soda ban, for the purposes of determining whether it is 
paternalistic, is not entirely clear. Although this is an important conceptual issue, it is beyond the 
scope of this paper: we will assume that a population-level intervention is paternalistic if it 
undermines the autonomy of some people to promote or protect the welfare of some people.  
If the autonomy-undermining and welfare-justification conditions are accepted as central to the 
concept of paternalism, then particular conceptions of paternalism will depend on the conceptions 
of autonomy and welfare employed.  We turn to these now.  
THE WELFARE-JUSTIFICATION CONDITION 
The welfare-justification condition will be satisfied when an actor attempts to justify an intervention 
on the grounds that it will promote some aspect of subjects’ welfare, or prevent their welfare from 
diminishing. Assessment of whether or not the welfare-justification condition has been met is 
relatively straightforward. There is no requirement that a paternalist is either genuine or single-
minded about the pursuit of subjects’ welfare. There is also no requirement that the welfare is 
promoted or protected as claimed. The condition will be met as long as an attempt is made to justify 
the action at least in part with reference to the welfare it could bring about. 
The justification for most public health interventions is an aim to deliver health benefits to a group 
of people or population. Whether they are oriented to deliver an aggregated good (the sum of 
benefits received separately by many individuals) or a corporate good (experienced by whole 
communities or populations, such as herd immunity, reliable city-wide sanitation, or a safe and 
effective blood bank),18 most public health interventions will readily satisfy the welfare-justification 
condition necessary to an accusation of paternalism.  
When faced with accusations of paternalism, public health professionals often respond by asserting 
that the actions concerned will substantially increase health, and so welfare. Notice, however, that 
this is not an adequate answer. While the welfare that is planned or achieved is likely to be relevant 
to a complete moral evaluation of an intervention, insisting that ‘our intervention will increase 
welfare’ cannot counter an accusation of paternalism. Rather, it provides evidence that one of the 
conditions for paternalism is satisfied and so supports, rather than refutes, the accusation. To 
successfully rebut charges of paternalism, public health professionals need to counter the 
implication that they are undermining autonomy, freedom or liberty.  
THE AUTONOMY-UNDERMINING CONDITION AND PATERNALISTIC ACTIONS  
Some notion of autonomy, liberty or freedom is fundamental to any discussion of paternalism, but 
these terms are often used in interchangeable or unexplained ways. Accusations of paternalism will 
be more serious the greater the moral significance of the aspects of autonomy, liberty or freedom 
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that are undermined. A case can be made that richer notions of autonomy, not just narrow 
conceptions of liberty or choice, are most significant.19   
We now draw on and extend the work of Catriona Mackenzie, who has distinguished between three 
main conceptions of autonomy—libertarian, decisional, and relational—and show how these alter 
the interpretation of the autonomy-undermining condition.10 We outline three associated 
conceptions of paternalism which we call, respectively, nanny-state, decisional and relational, and 
argue that the relational conception is the most useful for nuanced appraisals of public health 
activity.   
LIBERTARIAN AUTONOMY AND NANNY-STATE PATERNALISM 
Libertarian autonomy is the conception most commonly employed by strong critics of public health 
interventions. This conception loosely equates autonomy with negative liberty, that is, freedom from 
any interference by other persons or the state.11 The central concern on libertarian conceptions is 
respecting autonomy in a stand-back sense: minimising interference with any of the liberties and 
choices of individuals. This overlaps with positions which employ an often-oversimplified Millian 
harm principle to limit morally permissible action.9, 20  
Libertarian conceptions of autonomy suggest that any infringement on any negative liberty will be 
paternalistic if it is justified on the basis that it protects or enhances welfare. We propose that 
conceptions of paternalism associated with libertarian conceptions of autonomy be designated 
nanny-state conceptions. This is because, as discussed above, the descriptor nanny-state is used in 
practice to indicate identifiable, novel interferences in individual choices, and to infer that these 
frustrate achievement of a supposedly ideal state of total personal freedom and responsibility.1, 3, 4 
Any intervention that can be alleged to restrict individual choice is apparently open to nanny-state 
accusations.  
There are several problems with nanny-state conceptions of paternalism. First, they are so 
potentially inclusive of any interference with choice as to negate the possibility of government, 
because any functioning government will by necessity alter the choices available to their citizens in 
some way.8 Further, they invoke a version of human life in which people are most autonomous when 
entirely insulated from one another’s actions, and in which almost all freedoms and opportunities 
are equally important. This is descriptively and normatively inadequate. Human actions are rarely if 
ever unconstrained, we never have infinite choice, and we always live in environments that have 
been in some way engineered by someone for some purpose. Liberties are also important to us by 
degree; while some choices or freedoms are central to human wellbeing, others are trivial or 
invisible.21 The choices in which public health policies interfere will often be considered insignificant 
or justifiably limited by most members of a community, and some such interference must be 
potentially justifiable if any policy action is ever to proceed.8 Because nanny-state conceptions of 
paternalism make almost any interference problematic, they fail to distinguish those interferences 
that matter to citizens from those which do not.   
DECISIONAL AUTONOMY AND DECISIONAL PATERNALISM 
Another conception of autonomy focuses on decision-making. This conception features strongly in 
traditional clinical ethics, where respect for autonomy is generally understood to require the 
following:  1) the consent of patients should be sought when decisions are made about interventions 
relating to their health; 2) for this consent to be valid, patients should be: i) adequately competent; 
ii) adequately informed; and iii) acting voluntarily.11, 22, 23 This obliges health professionals to 
determine patients’ competence, inform them about options, and avoid unduly influencing their 
preferences and choice.11, 24  
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The associated conception of paternalism, which we call decisional paternalism, would tend to occur 
between individuals, for example a patient and either a clinician or a family member. On a decisional 
conception, a person behaves paternalistically if, with a welfare justification, they: 
1. Prevent the subject from choosing or having an opportunity to make a decision about something 
of importance to them; 
2. Fail to provide the subject with (or prevent the subject from accessing) information needed to 
make a good decision; and/or   
3. Unduly influence or control a decision that the subject is entitled to make for herself. 
The decisional conception of paternalism is normatively relevant: it points to potentially problematic 
actions. However the decisional conception of autonomy on which it rests is much-criticised, 
including for:  
1) disregarding the conditions in which autonomy is developed and sustained;  
2) ascribing too much significance to personal independence (like the libertarian conception);  
3) focusing on discrete decisions and neglecting other situations in which autonomy may be 
compromised; and  
4) neglecting the ways that some influences on decisions that appear to be the person’s own, 
including habit, bias and subconscious motivations, may have been shaped by oppressive 
social circumstances and relationships.23, 25   
Because decisional conceptions of paternalism are most relevant to local exchanges between 
individuals, they are relatively unworkable for evaluating most public health measures, other than 
those—like screening and vaccination—that are administered in clinic settings.    
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY AND RELATIONAL PATERNALISM  
Relational conceptions of autonomy retain a normative focus on the autonomy of individuals but 
eschew the kind of independence-idealising individualism associated with libertarian and frequently 
decisional conceptions. Theorists concerned to take seriously the sociality of human agency have 
developed a cluster of relational conceptions of autonomy in recent decades.25, 26 Recognising that 
human beings are all dependent on others to some degree, they have stressed the need to attend to 
the various ways in which interpersonal relationships and broader social arrangements can both 
foster and impede the development of people’s capabilities, values, self-identities, and the 
opportunities they have to exercise autonomy over the course of their lives.11, 25 Within these 
conceptions negative liberties are important for autonomy, so are a broad range of socially shaped 
opportunities. Relational theorists generally highlight the adverse effects of social oppression and 
exclusion on the development and exercise of autonomy, and often emphasise the need for states 
and others to positively value, foster and promote autonomy rather than simply respect it in a stand-
back sense.11, 25, 27  
Three dimensions of relational autonomy 
Mackenzie recently produced a new analysis of relational conceptions of autonomy.10 She suggested 
that autonomy comprises three interrelated dimensions: self-determination, self-governance and 
self-authorisation. When relationally conceptualised, each dimension can be seen to depend to 
some extent on the others as well as on a web of mutually supporting conditions. Each dimension 
can also be experienced to varying degrees.  
Self-determination and its conditions 
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A person who is self-determining is able to make important choices in her life and act on them. To be 
self-determining, people require political and/or personal freedoms and at least a threshold level of 
opportunities. These freedoms and opportunities are important conditions for self-determination: 
they create possibilities to act, hold values or pursue different ways of being. These conditions are 
primarily external and structural, shaped by the state and other societal institutions.10 Most 
relational theorists see securing them as a matter of justice. Relational theorists generally hold that 
some freedoms are more important than others for self-determination, and many consider the most 
important freedoms to be those vital to ensuring equality of opportunity.10  
Self-governance and its conditions 
The external, structural freedoms and opportunities necessary for self-determination influence the 
development and exercise of the more internal conditions for self-governance. Self-governance 
involves having the skills and capacities necessary to take advantage of opportunities where they 
exist, and to do so in a way that expresses, or is consistent with, one’s practical identity.10 A person’s 
practical identity develops throughout the course of her life. It includes her values, beliefs and sense 
of self, and evolves with ongoing self-reflection, dialogue and social interaction.10 The skills a person 
needs to govern herself in accordance with her practical identity are not just cognitive, but also 
emotional, imaginative and social. Although these skills are largely internal, they are socially shaped. 
Self-authorisation and its conditions 
Self-authorisation, the final dimension of relational autonomy, involves regarding oneself as having 
the normative authority required to be self-governing and self-determining.10  It means being 
prepared to take responsibility for one’s beliefs, values and practical commitments, being willing to 
provide reasons for these to others, and being willing to defend or revise these reasons if they are 
critically questioned.10 A person who lacks self-authorisation will not consider herself worthy to 
determine her own values or to make the kinds of commitments that become identity-defining. 
While conditions for self-determination inhere primarily in institutions, and the skills required for 
self-governance inhere in the individual, it seems to us that the conditions for self-authorisation 
arise from relationships between individuals and within communities. These relationships are 
underpinned by social recognition of people as moral equals and as self-authorising sources of valid 
claims.  
Mackenzie draws on insights from a range of relational theorists and identifies three main relevant 
conditions for self-authorisation:10  
1. Recognising oneself as the kind of person who can be held answerable or accountable to others; 
28 
2. Possession of, or ability to hold, certain self-evaluative attitudes: for example respecting oneself;  
trusting  that one’s own judgements, feelings and desires are a legitimate basis on which to 
deliberate; and having self-esteem (being able to see one’s life as meaningful);29 and  
3. Being recognised by others, to a sufficient degree, as a person who has the social standing of an 
autonomous agent (this underpins 1 and 2). 
The implications of relational autonomy for paternalism  
The details of how self-determination, self-governance and self-authorisation are characterised and 
constituted are the subject of ongoing scholarship and debate.26  Mackenzie’s helpful synthesis is 
sufficient, however, to allow us to see the value of using relational conceptions of autonomy to think 
about paternalism in public health contexts. On a relational account of paternalism, public health 
actors can be considered paternalistic if they:  
1) undermine people’s self-determination, self-governance, and/or self-authorisation; and  
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2) justify this by implicitly or explicitly suggesting that it will increase health or welfare.  
A relational conception of paternalism foregrounds the moral significance of respecting and 
promoting even partial or threatened autonomy, not only the autonomy of competent subjects. It 
emphasises that, because they are causally interconnected, undermining one dimension of 
autonomy (self-determination, self-governance or self-authorisation) will often have negative  
implications for the others as well. It recognises that public health interventions can increase as well 
as decrease citizen’s autonomy capabilities, and that this is not necessarily tied to health. It is 
possible that interventions that aim explicitly to increase people’s opportunities (and so capacity for 
self-determination), skills (and so capacity for self-governance) and self-evaluative attitudes (and so 
capacity for self-authorisation) also enable people to engage in more autonomous health promoting 
actions,30 however the value of fostering of autonomy is not contingent on any associated health 
improvement.  
DISCUSSION 
We noted at the outset that paternalism is a paradoxical concept, entailing a wrong (undermining 
autonomy) ostensibly justified by a good (increasing welfare). A well-founded accusation of 
paternalism must be based on an appropriate conception of autonomy. We have summarised the 
key features of libertarian, decisional and relational conceptions of autonomy (as elucidated by 
Mackenzie), and delineated three associated conceptions of paternalism: nanny-state, decisional 
and relational paternalism.  
In this discussion section, we first analyse three examples of public health intervention against the 
three conceptions of paternalism. We then compare the merits of the three conceptions, explaining 
why we think relational conceptions of paternalism are particularly valuable for both the defence 
and the critical appraisal of public health interventions. 
THREE EXAMPLES OF PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTION 
Consider three examples of public health intervention: the New York soda ban, the Australian social 
advertising campaign ‘LiveLighter’, and the World Health Organisation-endorsed Directly Observed 
Therapy Short-Course (DOTS) for tuberculosis (explained in Table 1). For reasons of scope we can 
discuss these interventions only with regard to whether or not they are paternalistic: a more 
comprehensive ethical analysis would attend to many other morally relevant considerations. These 
interventions all meet the welfare-justification condition, so whether or not they are paternalistic 
relies on whether they undermine autonomy.  As explained in Table 1, they will be assessed very 
differently depending on what conception of autonomy is employed.  We refer to these examples in 
the following discussion.  
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 SODA BAN 
 
‘LIVE LIGHTER’ SOCIAL ADVERTISING 
CAMPAIGN 
DIRECTLY OBSERVED THERAPY SHORT-
COURSE (DOTS) 
DESCRIPTION In mid-2012 Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg (New York), revealed 
plans to ban sales of sugary drinks 
sized >16 Oz (473 mL), justified as a 
strategy to reduce obesity and thus 
illness. After two years of legal 
contest, the regulation was 
overturned in the New York State 
Court of Appeals, 4-2, in June 2014.i 
Campaign in several Australian states, 
justified as a strategy to reduce obesity 
and thus illness. It was deliberately 
“targeted at adults…graphic and 
confronting…as achieving and 
maintaining a healthy weight is a priority 
and people need to do it now, not 
tomorrow.”ii Ads feature realistic footage 
of internal organs throbbing in a 
glistening sea of disgusting yellow “toxic 
fat”, and suggest people recall this image 
to control their “unhealthy” behaviours, 
for example to stop eating pizza out of 
the refrigerator at night, buying corn 
chips at the supermarket, driving instead 
of walking, and drinking soda. 
DOTS is a central plank of the World 
Health Organisation’s strategy to reduce 
the global burden of tuberculosis (TB).iii It 
has five components:  government 
commitment, case detection, a reliable 
drug supply, standardised reporting, and 
Directly Observed Therapy (DOT). DOT—
our focus here—requires that a health 
worker provides each dose of drug 
treatment, and observes the infected 
individual swallowing it, for at least the 
first two months of a 6-8 month course. 
NANNY-STATE 
PATERNALISM 
assumes autonomy is 
undermined by any (state) 
interference with personal 
or political freedom 
Likely to be paternalistic 
The soda ban arguably interferes in 
a personal freedom: the freedom to 
buy and sell large portions of soda. 
Unlikely to be paternalistic 
The campaign delivers a message: it does 
not infringe negative freedom. 
(Some libertarians would argue that 
publicly funded social advertising exceeds 
the proper role of government, but this is 
a different objection.)  
Likely to be paternalistic  
Infected individuals are not free to decline 
to take part in DOT or decline to be 
observed taking medication. (As noted in 
the text, some advocates of nanny-state 
arguments would use the harm principle 
to argue that this paternalism is justified.) 
DECISIONAL 
PATERNALISM 
focuses on decisions, 
assumes respect for 
autonomy involves 
informing people about 
Difficult to apply because decisional 
paternalism occurs during 
interactions between individuals.  
(An example of decisional 
paternalism would be a shopkeeper 
refusing to sell a large soda to an 
Difficult to apply because decisional 
paternalism occurs during interactions 
between individuals.  
Likely to be paternalistic 
Infected individuals are not offered 
options to decline to take part in DOT or 
to omit particular doses. Health worker 
will compound the paternalism if they fail 
to provide relevant information, further 
Table 1: Three public health interventions analysed via three conceptions of paternalism 
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options and not controlling 
their choices 
overweight person to prevent them 
from gaining more weight.)  
limit options, or coerce unwilling 
individuals to take medication.  
RELATIONAL 
PATERNALISM 
assumes autonomy can be 
undermined by 
interventions that 
adversely affect self-
determination, self-
governance  and/or self-
authorisation, or the 
conditions that underpin 
them 
Unlikely to be paternalistic 
To be paternalistic on a relational 
conception, intervention must 
undermine self-determination, self-
governance or self-authorisation or 
their necessary conditions. The 
ability to purchase soda in giant 
portions seems too trivial a freedom 
to be relevant here. 
Likely to be paternalistic 
Self-governance relies on authenticity 
(being able, on refection, to accept 
oneself); self-authorisation relies on self-
respect, self-trust and self-esteem, and 
on social recognition. Reinforcing the 
idea that fat bodies are disgusting, and a 
product of lack of self-control, has the 
potential to undermine self-governance 
and self-authorisation both directly (by 
reinforcing peoples’ negative view of 
themselves) and indirectly (by changing 
socially-held values, and thus social 
recognition). 
May be paternalistic to varying degrees, 
depending on implementation 
Self-determination depends on basic 
freedoms and opportunities: e.g. to 
work/earn income, to move from place to 
place. DOT can undermine these: e.g. if 
people become housebound waiting for 
supervised medication. Health workers 
may increase or undermine self-
governance, depending on whether they 
support or discourage skill-development 
e.g. understanding, critical reflection, 
decision making. Self-authorisation may 
be supported or undermined, depending 
on whether the person with TB is shown 
respect and treated as someone who 
considers themselves accountable to 
others. 
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NANNY-STATE, DECISIONAL OR RELATIONAL PATERNALISM FOR PUBLIC HEALTH?  
Our analysis suggests that the strengths of a relational conception, and the weaknesses of both 
nanny-state and decisional conceptions, mean that relational conceptions of paternalism are both 
the most useful and the most demanding for public health. 
Comparing decisional and relational conceptions of paternalism 
Decisional conceptions of paternalism are of limited relevance for many public health interventions 
(including the soda ban and LiveLighter—Table 1) because they are limited to decisions about 
particular interventions made between individuals.  
However decisional conceptions are potentially relevant when public health measures are 
administered in clinical settings. Even then, however, relational conceptions seem more nuanced. 
Consider DOT (Table1), which requires a person with TB to swallow medication under supervision.31-
33 Under a decisional conception this unavoidably diminishes people’s choices—they must take and 
be observed taking the medication—and is thus likely to be paternalistic. A relational conception, in 
contrast, is more nuanced.  
A relational conception suggests different ways of implementing DOT can be more or less 
paternalistic according to their implications for the development and exercise of autonomy. For 
example, DOT has been criticised for restricting opportunities for people with TB to seek or continue 
in employment, and then, because of the consequential loss of income, closing down other 
opportunities for them and their families.32, 33 The ability to work and earn income is a freedom basic 
to self-determination, and thus one of the external, structural conditions for self-determination in a 
relational account. A relational account also encourages attention to the effects of intervention on 
self-authorisation, which relies on self-respect, self-trust, self-esteem, believing oneself worthy to 
give reasons for ones actions, and being recognised as worthy. If DOT health workers act on the 
assumption that people who resist or do not engage with treatment are ignorant or wilfully bad, 
they will probably act paternalistically on a relational account. In contrast, if they explore and work 
with people’s reasons for resistance or non-engagement, assuming they are willing to be held 
accountable, they may support and enhance their autonomy and thus be less paternalistic. 
Approaches to DOT implementation that aimed to support patients’ self-determination, self-
governance and self-authorisation would be concordant with what many studies suggest people 
value in the delivery of care.34 For reasons mentioned above, a less relationally-paternalistic DOT 
may thus be both intrinsically and instrumentally preferable.  
Comparing nanny-state and relational conceptions of paternalism 
Our relational conception of paternalism also seems to have several advantages compared to the 
nanny-state conception.  
First, it seems as able as a nanny-state conception to capture serious infringements of negative 
freedom. However the relational conception will give weight only to those infringements that 
undermine self-determination, self-governance and/or self-authorisation. The relational conception 
is unlikely to support preoccupations with infringements that are less important, or even trivial (e.g. 
constraints on access to giant-size portions of soda) but encourages concern with infringements of 
fundamental freedoms (e.g. the freedom to work—Table 1). There are no bright lines between 
serious and un-serious infringements: these will need to be considered case by case. But relational 
conceptions provide a far more detailed account of the types of freedoms and opportunities that 
matter and why, and so provide more support for moral evaluation of public health interventions.  
Second, relational conceptions of autonomy and paternalism better reflect the complex 
psychological and social realities of human life; because of this they are also more demanding of the 
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stance public health takes towards citizens. Take, for example, the LiveLighter campaign, which 
makes fat bodies disgusting and links this to certain behaviours (Table 1). As a messaging campaign, 
LiveLighter is unlikely to be considered paternalistic on a nanny-state conception as it does not 
remove choices or constrain action. A relational conception, however, would be much more critical 
of the campaign, particularly its implications for self-authorisation and self-governance. 
Relational conceptions would take seriously the fact that obesity is already a stigmatised condition35-
37 and that disgust-based campaigns risk amplifying this existing social norm, undermining self-
respect, self-esteem and social recognition and thus self-authorisation. Empirical evidence shows 
that, particularly in already-marginalised people, the threat of being stereotyped creates anxiety, 
stress and self-consciousness (undermining self-authorisation) as well as diminished cognitive 
performance (undermining self-governance) and thus decreases performance and motivation.38 
Stereotyping messages risk increasing these effects, and LiveLighter arguably transmits stereotyping 
messages: e.g. that people are fat because they stand by an open refrigerator at night eating cold 
pizza, as the protagonist of one advertisement does. Self-governance relies both on the ability to 
reflectively accept oneself, and the development of the cognitive skills necessary to act in keeping 
with this self, such as understanding, critical reflection, and self-control. Messages that employ 
disgust and fear, or demand that citizens conform with “healthy behaviours” rather than fostering 
critical thinking and understanding, do not seem likely to promote self-governance.  Relational 
accounts can encourage public health practitioners to value autonomy as well as health, and to work 
in ways that do not promote one at the expense of the other. 
The third advantage of relational conceptions over nanny-state conceptions is this: relational 
conceptions recognise that states are uniquely positioned to ensure citizens have real freedoms and 
opportunities that matter, and that a negligent state can be as problematic as an interfering state. A 
relational conception of paternalism can support a case that states have positive as well as negative 
duties.  This potentially sanctions intervening to address social conditions that limit freedoms and 
opportunities (including but not limited to those that undermine citizens’ health), interventions that 
a nanny-state conception would reject. Public health, as a social institution, can contribute to the 
political and personal freedoms and opportunities fundamental to self-determination,39 to effective 
autonomy-relevant skill development, and to the creation of social space for the expression of 
diverse identities and the promotion of values of respect and inclusivity. Only relational conceptions 
recognise these positive duties, and recognise that autonomy capabilities are inter-linked and 
depend in large part on formal institutions and socio-cultural norms. 
 
CONCLUSION 
If a nanny-state conception of paternalism is allowed to dominate public discourse, many attempts 
to improve public health will be framed as unjustifiable simply by virtue of their ‘interference’. 
This—perversely, given that accusations of paternalism are intended to help protect autonomy—will 
preclude the tackling of many socially shaped health problems, including obesity and smoking, that 
arise at least in part in social environments that impair people’s autonomy.  
A nanny-state conception of paternalism does currently seem to dominate. We noted earlier that 
public health advocates have often struggled to rebut nanny-state accusations. The most common 
responses—either denial, or stressing the welfare produced by the intervention—are unsatisfactory. 
Our analysis suggests a better response to nanny-state accusations. This involves acknowledging the 
normative significance of paternalism, critiquing the libertarian conception of autonomy entailed in 
nanny-state accusations, presenting the relational alternative, and explaining how public health 
interventions can positively support the self-determination, self-governance and self-authorisation 
that are necessary for autonomy. As well as supporting a robust defence of autonomy-supporting 
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public health interventions, relational conceptions of paternalism can support a nuanced critique of 
autonomy-undermining ones. Public health, we conclude, should stop being afraid of nanny-state 
accusations, and instead promote and apply a more robust, relational, view of autonomy and 
paternalism.  
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